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This paper looks at the involvement and influence of capitalists on
the Social Security Act of 1935. Instead ofpositing direct corporate
control, the research shows how social security was formulated with-
in a corporate liberal ideological framework which defined problems
and their solutions in terms ofputting the maintenance ofcapitalism
above the needs of individual workers. This framework set the limits
of the, social insurance debates long before the act itself was written.
The thesis is that the Social Security Act came about as a result of
an interplay between the environment and an ideology advanced by
corporate leaders and reform-minded academicians.
The Social Security Act of 1935 represents the first legislation in
which the United States government acknowledged a duty to guarantee
economic security against the hazards of old age and unemployment as
a right not based on need. But there has been a great deal of criticism of
welfare policies of the capitalist state for contributing more to the
maintenance of the existing capitalist system and its inequalities than
meeting needs of individuals (Gough, 1979; Ginsburg, 1979). With this
issue in mind, this paper will look at the involvement and influence of
capitalists in the formation of the Social Security Act of 1935 in order
to explore the relationship between the economy and the state in fram-
ing social policy. Far from arguing an instrumentalist view (that corpo-
rate leaders directly control policy formation), this research shows how
the Social Security Act came about because of the way problems were
framed and solutions formulated which held the interests of capital
foremost, long before the act was ever conceived.
* This work is drawn from "The Origins of the Social Security Act of 1935: Policy
Formation in Capitalist Society," a master's thesis at the University of Missouri-
Columbia, 1983. Thanks to the thousands who helped with that project, particu-
larly Craig Jenkins and Karen Altergott, and Al DiChiara and Ten Shumate who
helped with this draft. Also, thanks to the Midwest Council for Social Research in
Aging for support.
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The process of policy formation has been the subject of much
oJ attention by those interested in a theoretical understanding of the rela-
tion between the state and the economic sector in capitalist societies.
Much of this research presents evidence indicating that social welfare
policies are formulated by members of the corporate elite with their
own interests at heart (Domhoff, 1978; Weinstein, 1968; Radosh, 1972;
Kolko, 1963; O'Connor, 1973). However, the Social Security Act of
1935 has received relatively little attention in this regard. Most histor-
ical research on the formation of the Social Security Act centers on the
plurality of interests involved and the compromises reached by these
various interests in the final stages of the Act (Pratt, 1976; Lubove,
1968; Chambers, 1963; Sanders, 1973). On the other hand, G. William
Domhoff (1970) has elaborated his instrumentalist theory by arguing
that a class-conscious capitalist elite (drawn largely from big business)
directly controlled the policy formation process by funding the univer-
sities and research organizations that did the research for the Act, and
by occupying key positions in Roosevelt's executive branch of govern-
ment, providing direct and conscious ruling class control over its formu-
lation.
In contrast, Theda Skocpol (1980) argues against direct capitalist
control and puts more emphasis on political and structural processes.
She claims business adamantly opposed the New Deal and that the
working class won these reforms because the Democratic Party, in its
rise to power, needed to mobilize the support of the industrial working
classes. Fred Block (1977) claims there is a division of labor between an
autonomous state elite wishing to expand its own powers, and a capital-
ist class opposed to state expansion and normally possessing veto power
by virtue of its control over the economy. During crisis periods, such as
the' Depression, "business confidence" is not so powerful and state
managers are able to advance policies that enhance their position with
the voting public. Most of these Marxist .approaches seem to claim
either the workings of the invisible hand of the structure of capitalism
or direct capitalist control of policy formation. In addition, these
accounts differ over the role of businesses in the debates, and seem to
isolate the formulation of the Social Security Act from a broader social
and historical context.
It is my contention that the Social Security Act was neither the
product of direct corporate control, nor the invisible hand of structural
processes, nor the result of compromises between various groups. This
Act, which has contributed so strongly to the maintenance of the
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existing set of capitalist relations, was formulated with the interests of
capital over the interests of workers. However, the historical framework
from which social insurance arose involved both social actors linked to
the corporate elite, and the political and economic structure, which
they sought to influence, but which constrained them as well. The Act
was the result of an interplay between a set of ideas which arose in
response to an environment threatening to the position of the capitalist
class, through the agency of the academicians and a range of liberal
capitalists who created these ideas. To understand this, one must look
at how the problems were defined and their solutions formulated and
in so doing, see how the policy options were made consistent with the
maintenance of the capitalist system many years before the Act was
written. Once the basic outlines were formed, no radically different
social insurance proposal, either from working class movements or non-
corporate liberal capitalists, could enter the policy making process.
Corporate Liberalism
Social insurance as we know it had its earliest intellectual roots in
the late 19th century transformation of liberal thought from an individ-
ualist laissez faire ideology to the social responsibility, interventionist
ideology of the 20th century. It was the view of this new corporate
liberalism that provided justifications and methods for social insurance
in America, along a course that was entirely consistent with the contin-
uance of a capitalist system.
Twentieth century corporate "liberalism, as James Weinstein
(1968) defines it, involves an ideology which holds that social engineer-
ing, social efficiency and social responsibility are the means to stabilize,
rati?nalize and expand the existing capitalist political economy, and
avo~d. dangerou-s alternate forms of social organization, especially
SOCIalIsm. In the attempt to succeed in this endeavor, the economist
arose as the technical expert who would develop government policy
t~at ~ould create and maintain a stable social order. As corporate
liberalism developed, it succeeded in co-opting a potentially radical and
often violent working class by incorporating labor representatives as
junior partners in a business/government association designed to work
out "rational" and "efficient" solutions to conflicts and maintain
~nd~strial peace '. Terms such as efficiency and stabilization replaced
justice as the mam expressed goal. However, corporate liberalism, as it
shall be discussed throughout this paper, cannot be viewed as a static,
autonomous concept. It was a dynamic set of ideas that originated in
25
Mid-American Review of Sociology
the minds of humans and was both shaped by and shaped interaction in
a social environment. This ideology laid the intellectual groundwork,
set the ideological boundaries, and devised the methods used in the
formulation of the Social Security Act as "the" solution to the prob-
lems of old age and unemployment.
Corporate liberal ideas originated in Germany in the late 187Os
and were first brought to the United States by a group of prominent
American economists trained in the German Historical School of Eco-
nomics centered at the University of Heidelberg. Contrary to classical
economics and its abstract reasoning and individualistic emphasis on
natural rights and natural law, this group believed economic phenomena
could best be understood by using statistical investigations and induc-
tive methods to shape economic institutions to meet social goals
through active state intervention. The members of this school formed
the Union for Social Politics (Verein fiir Sozialpolitik) in Germany to
gather economic information to meet "the acknowledged need ... of
social reform in -opposition to social revolution on the one hand, and to
rigid laissez faire on the other" (Dorfman, 1955 :21). These attempts to
"meet the challenge of socialism resulted in an advanced program of
social insurance, culminating in Bismark's program of sickness, acci-
dent, invalidity and old age insurance" (Dorfman, 1955 :21).
The American economists from this school returned to the
United States with these ideas during the late 1880s and 90s, years
fraught with long and severe depressions and widespread labor unrest.
Many, including some businessmen, were losing confidence in the
ability of an unregulated economy to maintain social order, and these
economists did much to change the scope of American economics. The
work of Richard Ely in particular helped define and institutionalize
emerging corporate 'liberal 'thought and subsequent notions of social
insurance.
Ely, impressed with the efficiency of the German government,
believed the United States government could likewise efficiently shape
economic life for the good of the public. He outlined programs of social
reform that resembled those of the New Deal over 40 years later-
public housing, public work for the unemployed, child and female labor
restrictions, and government insurance for protection against death, old
age, sickness and accidents (Fine, 1956; Ely, 1894). His reforms had the
expressed goals of avoiding socialist- violence and revolution, and main-
taining the existing class structure by eliminating the waste and ineffi-
ciency of the present system (Fine, 1956; Ely, 1894). Ely published 25
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books and 280 pamphlets and articles before his death in 1937. His
students included a long list of New Dealers, reformists, economists,
sociologists and others who became important in forming American
social policy during the first half of the twentieth century.
Liberal Businessmen Join uritli Academia
While a large majority of individuals in policy making positions
and business leaders continued to espouse a laissez faire ideology well
into the 1900s, a core of business leaders, reacting to the labor unrest
and radicalism, market instability and disorganized competition of the
time, were reassured by these new economic ideas that promised greater
control over the economic environment. These business leaders joined
with Richard Ely and other like-minded academics to form the National
Civic .Federation in 1901, the American Association for Labor Legisla-
tion (AALL) in 1906, the University of Wisconsin industrial research
group in 1904, the Special Conference Committee (later the Business
Advisory Council) in 1919, the Twentieth Century Fund, the National
Bureau of Economic Research, the National Industrial Conference
Board, the Brookings Institute, the Taylor Society, and Industrial Rela-
tions Counsellors. 1
The work of these organizations as well as several prominent
corporate liberal businessmen set the major lines of debate, the
methods of research and the justifications for the Social Security Act of
1935. These organizations set the stage for government action on social
insurance by: 1) encouraging and developing private welfare plans in
liberal corporations which provided policy exemplars and experienced
businessmen to help write the Social Security Act; 2) fostering federal
interest and getting businessmen and academics involved in the prob-
lems of unemployment; and 3) creating policy and helping to pass state
legislation which increased the acceptance of corporate liberal ideas as
policy on social insurance.
Private HJelfare Plans
The National Civic Federation (NCF) was the first of the policy
consensus organizations to link corporate liberalism to business-
advocated social reforms. It was organized by Ely and certain liberal
businessmen and"... championed protective labor. legislation and the
'right' kind of business regulation" (Domhoff, 1970:164). Their wel-
fare committee along with the Special Conference Committee was
27
Mid-American Review of Sociology
crucial in educating other businesses about the need to enact corpo-
rate welfare programs to pacify workers, undercut unions, and make
production more efficient. Some of the same business leaders involved
in the NCF welfare department, such as Owen Young and Gerard
Swope of General Electric, Henry Dennison of Dennison Manufacturing
Company, Edward and Lincoln Filene of Filene Sons Department .
Stores, Morris Leeds of Leeds and Northrup, and Walter Teagle of Stan-
dard oil of New Jersey were involved in the Special Conference Com--
mittee. They were leaders in urging managerial reforms, collective
bargaining, trade associationism, various corporate welfare schemes, and
at least minimal government involvement in the economy. Using the
Special Conference Committee as a base, Swope and Teagle promoted
the creation of company unions, employee pensions and insurance in
the early 1920s to restore stability to labor. Some of these welfare pro-
grams adopted by corporations (particularly General Electric and East-
man Kodak) provided important precedents for the Social Security Act,
and these same men were active participants in its later formulation.
In fact, corporate liberal goals of stabilization and efficiency can
clearly be seen in most of the corporate welfare plans instituted prior to
the Depression. As early as 1909 in a speech to the National Civic Fed-
eration, George Perkins of International Harvester advocated death,
sickness and disability insurance and pensions to stimulate initiative,
strengthen cooperation and so increase earnings (Weinstein, 1968). By
1919, Dennison Manufacturing Company had a full range of labor
bonuses including retirement, disability and worker representation, the
first unemployment insurance program in the United States, and was
able to decrease labor turnover by regularizing production and
employment schedules. Railroads were early leaders in pension plans
because of the expressed need to get slower, less careful, older workers
out of this hazardous industry. However, many of the benefits of these
early welfare plans were illusory because they were not backed by
reserves. Since there were no employee contributions, employers had
the right to cut benefits at any time (Greenough, 1976:36).
Gerard Swope of General Electric experimented the most in wel-
fare plans. According to a study conducted at General Electric, effi-
ciency peaked at age 32 and dropped in half by age 65. Therefore, the
savings from retiring older workers at half wages could be used to hire
younger more efficient workers (Loth, 1958). As Swope's biographer
conceded, the worker's welfare was not central to Swope's concern and
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simply "was a matter of efficiency" (Loth, 1958:158). Other progres-
sive employers voiced similar justifications for their corporate welfare
schemes. Dennison maintained into the 1920s that organized coopera-
tion with workers to improve employment standards was simply cold-
blooded science (Berkowitz and McQuaid, 1978:127). This kind of
justification (echoed by the work of John R. Commons and followers
in Wisconsin) was partially successful in convincing many other firms to
enact plans.
Not all employers bought Swope and Teagle's radical plans. POSt
World War I corporate liberalism was highly successful, particularly in
light of the labor unrest of the times, and many companies adopted re-
forms. But by the mid- to late-1920s, corporate liberalism began to lose
its impetus. With rising wages, a quieter labor force and a stock market
boom, most businesses were doing quite well without welfare plans.
Only the large companies with 15,000 or more" employees kept their
programs (Greenough, 1976), and a core of corporate liberals continued
to experiment, particularly Swope and Marion Folsom of Eastman
Kodak. It was not until the Depression and the economic collapse of
many of these plans that these same employers called for federal
action.
These corporate welfare plans served as examples in framing the
Social Security Act of 1935. Their dominant theme was efficiency-
maximum productivity as motivation for inducing older workers to
retire with pensions, smoothing out cycles in employment for more
efficient productivity-themes echoed by the academic arm of corpo-
rate liberalism (John Commons and the Wisconsin reformers, the AALL
and the various research organizations). It is also important to note that
these same liberal employers were also the ones most involved in the
academic' research and reform organizations, in the growing relation-
ships between business and government, as well as the formulation of
the Social Security Act.
Legislative Precursors of the Social Security Act
Although all of the organizations mentioned were involved in
various ways, two groups were particularly active in pushing legislation
that set precedents for the Social Security Act; the American Associa-
tion for Labor Legislation and the University of Wisconsin. The Univer-
sity of Wisconsin had a close working relationship with the state and
did much legislative research and drafting, helping Wisconsin become a
model state for social reforms during the Progressive Era of 1904 to
1913.
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Richard Ely help found the group through ties with capitalists in
the National Civic Federation and other contacts. His student, John
Commons, essentially headed the group, did much of the legislative
work for the State of Wisconsin and developed Ely's philosophies into
workable, practical legislation. Commons influenced both the econo-
mists and the work of the University of Wisconsin, and the American
Association for Labor Legislation. He developed what he called an
American tradition of reform-working within the existing social order
to very gradually enact reforms to preserve and extend opportunity for
individual advancement, therefore proceeding safely and surely toward
a stable social order. Commons "wanted to save capitalism by making it
good" (Commons, 1934). He was also involved in the National Civic
Federation, president of the National Consumer's League, director of
the National Bureau of Economic Research, president of the American
Economic Association in 1918 and president of the National Monetary
Association (Harter, 1962:38).
Commons' method of successfully enacting reforms, including
social insurance, was to convince individual businesses to implement
changes within their firms, find out what worked best, and use these
models to pass statewide legislation. According to Rimlinger (1971 :67)
social insurance made its most rapid gains where its profitability was
demonstrated, and Commons was "a master in the appeal to employer
self-interest for the sake of social causes," particularly in the field of
workmen's compensation. As Commons himself said,
It was shown that by preventing accidents, nobody, not even the
consumers by higher prices, would bear any burden in paying the
benefits to workmen stipulated in the compensation laws. In other .
-words, the appeal was made "to a new kind- of efficiency, efficiency
in preventing accidents, by which costs of production could be
reduced, with the result that prices need not be increased
(1959:857).
Thus for Commons, the Wisconsin group of reformers and all their
followers, the ideology of social insurance came to be centered around
an appeal to employer self-interest (efficiency), not an appeal to
paternalism or social solidarity (Rimlinger, 1971 :67).
Charles McCarthy, head of the Wisconsin Legislative Reference
Library, reiterated the link between this philosophy and Ely and his
German training. Anyone who had been to Germany knew the state
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"must protect and invest in the life and happiness of the individual in
order that the greatest prosperity might come from it and that security,
peace and happiness are the best foundations of good government and
prosperity" (McCarthy, 1912:161). Said McCarthy in testimony at the
Commission on Industrial Relations in 1911:
The backbone here [of McCarthy's political thought] is that the
state must invest in human beings in the same way as you invest in
cattle on a farm .... You have got to have better human beings....
A man will produce more, and the employer will get more for his
money, and the state will get more out of the man, and my idea is
that the state ought to invest in the health, strength, intelligence and
ability of the people who make up the state (Weinstein, 1968 :201).
The first unemployment insurance act in the country, passed in
Wisconsin, later became the main prototype for the Social Security Act
of 1935. Indeed, the Wisconsin economists later dominated the mem-
bership of the Committee on Economic Security. As an extension and
practical application of the German School, the ideas of Commons and
other Wisconsin academics helped further institutionalize the corporate
liberal ideology for future social insurance debates. The "Wisconsin
approach" of stressing social reforms where both labor and business
could benefit narrowed the direction future social insurance legislation
would take. The appeal to employer self-interest through efficiency
helped gain the support of business leaders, which helped guarantee
that this approach and not other more paternalistic or worker-initiated
approaches wouldbe taken in future policy formulation.
Far more important nationally, although working closely with
the Wisconsin grciup in outlining the terms of the social insurance de-
bates and influencing the form of the Social Security Act, was the
American Association for Labor Legislation (Lubove, 1968; Eakins,
1966:59). The AALL was also founded by Richard Ely, and was
financed in its early years by many of the same people who were in-
volved in the National Civic Federation. Ely was its first president and
John Commons was secretary from 1908 until Commons' student,
John Andrews, took over as secretary and led the organization's efforts
from 1910-1942. The membership of the AALL from 1906 until the
19.30s included business leaders, labor leaders and academics and even a
few socialists in its earlier days. Many positions of power, including
several terms of the presidency were held by business leaders.
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The primary goal of the AA~L was to bring about uniform labor
legislation at the state level. The AALL ideology embodied many cor-
porate liberal ideas discussed so far, such as using technical experts a~d
scientific study to help the state regulate capitalism and enact SOCIal
reforms as an alternative to socialism. It emphasized social justice
arising from an efficient corporate society (Eakins, 1966; Skocpol,.
1980). Clearly the organization was strongly influenced by the philos-
ophies of Ely and Commons in stressing social reforms for maintenance
of the existing capitalist order. And just as clearly, business could ~lly
itself with these ideas for both its short and long term goals. According
to Skocpol (1980 :33) the AALL succeeded in putting its ideas into law
because it responded to problems within the existing system, con-
fronted the social changes of maturing capitalism and "attained a con-
sensus of cross class support.
The AALL was central in formulating the unemployment insur-
ance debates. It established a Committee on Unemployment and
sponsored two national conferences on unemployment during the
Depression of 1914. It also published surveys of the national unemploy-
ment situation in 1914-15 and in 1920-21 (Lubove, 1968:59). Even
more significantly, the AALL was central in enacting the Social Secu-
rity Act (Witte, 1962). The AALL model unemployment insurance bill,
called the American Plan, which was circulated in state legislatures and
became Wisconsin law in 1932, focused on employer incentives to
stabilize employment in their own firms by rewarding those having less
unemployment with lower insurance rates. The Social Security Act was
in part modeled after this bill.
Business and Governrnent Partnership in Social Insurance Planning
. After "a surge of interest in a government-business partnership
that arose as a result of the cooperative planning efforts of World War I,
business and government were cool toward direct government control
in the economy. In the arena of labor reforms, voluntarism was the
dominant theme up until the Depression. However, even during this
period relationships between the federal government and businesses
were developing which would set important precederits for the social
insurance events of the New Deal.
During the post war depression in 1920-21, Secretary of
Commerce Hoover and President Harding called a Presidential Confer-
ence on Unemployment. Delegates representing the American Associa-
tion for Labor Legislation included many liberal business leaders who
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had enacted welfare plans in their own corporations, and many
academics involved in other corporate liberal organizations. The sub-
committee on Business Cycles and Unemployment chaired by Owen D.
Young of General Electric and the National Bureau of Economic
Research reported the need for remedies for cyclical fluctuations in
employment and recommended more research on the issue. As a result,
Hoover assigned the National Bureau of Economic Research the task
and the Carnegie Corporation granted $50,000 for the study (Eakins,
1966 :160). The American Association for Labor Legislation, the
Department of Agriculture, and the Federated American Engineering
Society also contributed to the project.
The study done from 1921-24 was used by the Committee to
come up with an essentially voluntaristic, but nonetheless corporate
liberal, set of recommendations. The study endorsed the idea that
economic slumps were caused by waste, extravagance and inefficiency,
and industry should make use of technical economic information pro-
vided by the government to voluntarily regulate themselves to over-
come seasonal fluctuations. In these ways, government, business, and
labor would all work together for a more efficient economy. It was
implicitly recognized that federal government spending could be manip-
ulated to counter business cycles. And, although there was no recom-
mendation for unemployment insurance, they believed the idea was
worth considering. The influence of corporate liberal ideas, especially
those of the American Association for Labor Legislation is obvious. The
idea of smoothing business cycles to lower unemployment and increase
efficiency became an important argument in the Social Security Act
hearings.
The resurgence of the economy and several boom years took any
sense of urgency out of the ideas of this committee. lt was not until
1927 that another significant study was organized resurrecting the old
Unemployment Conference of the 1921 Committee. This Committee"
on Recent Economic Changes consisted of members of the National
Bureau for Economic Research (NBER) and business leaders. Ironically,
the report, titled Recent Economic Changes in the United States, and
its rosy portrait of the U.S. economy was not issued until 1929, two
months after the market crash. Immediately the NBER did another
report, Recent Social Trends in the LI.S. (1933), which was mildly in
favor of national planning, insurance programs, including unemploy-
ment insurance and progressive taxes. Putting more purchasing power in
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the hands of wage earners was among their recommendations, and this
too became an important idea echoed in the hearings for the Social
Security Act.
The Depression
The Depression was the final impetus toward national govern-
ment action. As it became evident that the Depression was no normal
slump in the business cycle, even more conservative business leaders
looked to government for help. Labor unrest was increasing, and the
masses of unemployed were becoming militant. With a growing business
sentiment favoring state intervention, it was easier for corporate liberal
leaders to gain popular acceptance and translate their ideas into laws on
social insurance. Several intertwined factors stemming from the Depres-
sion led to the change in majority business opinion and the final corpo-
rate liberal decisions on the Social Security Act. The AALL increased
its drive for unemployment insurance and precedent setting laws gained
popularity at the state level. At the same time, worker unrest tempo-
rarily increased private pension action, and subsequent failure led busi-
ness leaders to push for action. Finally, all of this corporate liberal
policy planning was put into action with the formation of the Com-
mittee on. Economic Security and the passage of the Social Security
Act.
An interesting business-initiated plan was designed by Gerard
Swope. His plan for economic recovery in 1931 included extensive wel-
fare measures including unemployment compensation, pensions, life
insurance, disability insurance and a federal body to oversee welfare
schemes. These kinds of measures to help industry, said Swope, would
"trickle down" to increase employment and income support for the
masses, preserve earned benefits for workers who changed jobs and
coordinate production and consumption (McQuaid, 1982:22-3). This
plan was based on the premise that low consumption was a cause of the
Depression (an idea that would be stated in the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research 1933 Recent Social Trends Report), and that consump-
tion would be higher if people felt safe about spending money. This
sense of security would result from protection from the hazards of old
age and unemployment (Loth, 1958). While Hoover rejected Swope's
plan, then Governor Roosevelt supported it, and later included Swope
in pre-Social Security planning.
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Political History of Social Security
The political history of the Social Security bill demonstrates
clearly the carrying out of the corporate liberal link between business,
academicians and government. Swope and Young actively advised
Roosevelt up until he appointed the Committee on Economic Security
to research and write the bill, and the Committee was careful to carry
out Roosevelt's wishes (Witte, 1962). Key positions on this committee
were held by Wisconsin group people and AALL members, and a major-
ity of the participants were connected in some way to corporate liberal
organizations. The advisory council to the committee consisted of labor
representatives, "public" members and business leaders. The business-
men were clearly those who were connected to corporate liberal ideas.
There was much debate within this committee, and in Congress on the
specific details of the bill, but overall the Social Security Act was
framed in corporate liberal terms. In fact, the bill changed little once it
was in Congress. Indeed, there were only two radical alternatives put
before Congress at that time: the Townsend Bill (advocating $200 per
month for everyone over 60) and the Lundeen Bill (advocating benefits
equal to average local wages to all workers and farmers over 18 who
were unemployed through no fault of their own). But neither of these
bills, nor working class movements, nor general non-corporate liberal
business opposition could legitimately enter the policy making process
once the basic outlines were formulated.
The corporate liberal ideology had clear hegemony and domi-
nated Congressional debates. A survey of Congressional hearings shows
that stabilization of industry was the dominant theme and debates
among those involved in government, the Committee on Economic
Security, and liberal industry centered around the best method of
stabilization. In justifying the act to Congress, administration spokes-
persons, including advisory council member Marion Folsom of Kodak
and. other businessmen supporting the act, emphasized that unemploy-
ment insurance would stabilize the labor force as well as .purchasing
powervhence giving employers more predictable markets.
Even old age insurance was viewed in terms of stabilization and
efficiency. According to a report published by the Social Security
Board (1937:199), old age insurance was created to enhance the
elderly's sense of security and confidence, get old people out of the
labor market and stabilize their consumption expenditures. Hence, old
age insurance was viewed as helping to solve part of the unemployment
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problem, a problem viewed more in terms of the inefficiency of in-
dustry rather than the effects on the worker. According to Murray
Latimer, who helped write the old age provisions of the Act:
There are a number of industrial companies who's level of produc-
tive efficiency has been and is being reduced by the fact that they
have a number of old men whom they would like to retire but can-
not on account of public pressure, and at the same time they have
not sufficient funds available to start a pension system (Latimer,
Senate Finance Committee Hearings, 1935:749).
After explaining how benefits would induce elders to leave the labor
force, increase wages, absorb the yo~ng employed and also take the
burden of support off their children, Latimer added, "nor should the
advantages of the maintenance of a large and continuing stream of
purchasing power directed almost entirely to consumer goods be over-
looked" (Ways and Means Committee Hearings, 1935:223-4). The
advantages for the stabilization of industry via production and con-
sumption was the central theme of the debates on old age insurance.
Conclusions
The development of corporate liberalism from the German
Historical School through the research and policy planning organiza-
tions composed of capitalists and academics gradually altered views
toward social insurance by encouraging businesses to believe it could
help expand their industries as well as ensure social peace. Industrial
and .social rationalization and stabilization; and, the social benefits of a
more efficient corporate system were the key values. The policy plan-
ning 'groups involved the same businessmen and academics who would
later help formulate the Social Security Act. These groups and certain
liberal businessmen began to participate in government studies on
unemployment insurance and began to push for state legislation and
private pension plans that would serve as exemplars for the Social
Security Act. These exemplars specifically centered on rationalizing
and stabilizing industry. Social justice for the worker was a subsidiary
concern. The Social Security Act was a culmination of corporate liberal
ideas on unemployment-the need to have predictable and efficient
labor and consumer markets through payments to those previously tied
to the labor market, and the need to smooth out business cycles. Old
age insurance was likewise viewed as a means to .remove inefficient
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older workers from the labor force and put more money in consumers'
pockets. In addition, both unemployment and old age insurance were
contingent on labor force participation and in fact excluded large num-
bers of the labor force that were not tied to mainstream industry (such
as agricultural workers, domestic servants and seamen), reinforcing
dependency on the labor market for subsistence. Hence the Act was
formulated with the interests of industry foremost.
By looking at how the problems of unemployment and old age
security were defined and solutions formulated, we can see that the
Social Security Act was not the result of compromises of varying inter-
ests. It involved compromise, but at a level that already defined the
interests of capital as the ones of primary concern. No alternative non-
corporate liberal concerns were able to gain access into the policy
formation process. The Act and its formulation did reflect the ultimate
dominance of capitalist interests and consequently the dominance of
the capitalist class. But it is important to see that the Act was not en-
tirely the result of the structure of capitalism or the desires of a corpo-
rate elite. The research points to a dialectical relationship between
actors and social structure-an interplay between the ideas of corporate
liberalism and how they were developed by powerful actors who were
trying to deal with the social unrest, depressions and instability gen-
erated by a capitalist system. A discourse developed that created the
perception of social problems and their solutions in terms of the best
way to maintain the existing set of capitalist relations, and the Social
Security Act was"a reflection of this discourse. Therefore, it is impor-
tant to look at how policy options are determined before a specific
policy is formulated in order to understand the relationship ,between
ideology, particular social actors and a particular environment which, in
this case, sustained the capitalist order in our society.
FOOTNOTES
1. These can be grouped into two kinds of organizations. The first attempted
to generate broad consensus on policy reforms and included business and
academics with labor representatives as junior partners in their member-
ships. The second group were the research organizations that collected facts
needed to propose reforms. Many of the same liberal businessmen and
academics were involved in both groups. Typically, big business donated
money and controlled the research agenda from boards of trustees while
academics conducted the research.
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THE ELDERLY OF HISPANIC ORIGIN:
POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS FOR 1980
Elena Bastida
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Among the most significant trends of the twentieth century has
been the continued growth of elderly populations, both in absolute
numbers and in relation to other segments of American society. Popu-
lation projections for the United States suggest that the number of
elderly will continue to increase relative to other age groups. These pro-
jections also suggest that there will be an increase in the number of
minority older persons 65 years of age or older. Presently, members of
national minority groups make up a small proportion of the aged popu-
lation. In 1980 about 11.7 percent of the 65 and over population were
Black, 3 percent were Hispanic, 1.5 percent were Asians and less than
0.6 percent were Native American. Minority populations tend to be
younger with much smaller percentages. of older persons than Whites.
For example, about 7.9 percent of the Black population is 65 years of
age or older, compared to about 4.9 percent of Hispanics, somewhat
over 5.3 percent of Asian Americans and a little more than 5.3 percent
of the Native American population.
It must be noted, however, that some subgroups within the His-
panic cluster are not consistent with the broad pattern presented above.
It is important to recognize that life experiences, broad demographic
factors and structural conditions suggest considerable variations be-
tween them that is not easily gleaned from aggregated data. This paper,
therefore, focuses on salient demographic trends regarding each sub-
group within the Hispanic. cluster (i.e., Mexican, Puerto Rican and
Cuban) and examines dissimilarities in life expectancy, educational
achievement, economic status and regional distribution which are
attributable to within cluster structural deprivation and not to cultural
disparities. An underlying assumption of this paper is that inequalities
in American society have generated many of the observed socio-
demographic variations among subgroups of older Hispanics. Further-
more, the demographic characteristics exhibited by either the cluster,
the subgroup, or both primarily reflect the minority status of this popu-
lation within the larger structure of American society and as such are
independent of cultural influences. Lastly, it is the author's view that
the "double jeopardy" hypothesis, about which much has been written
